This paper examines the active re-construction of indigenous identities within the Plurinational State of Bolivia through the case study of a resource conflict that arose with the government's announcement of its intention to build a road through a national park and indigenous territory, the Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS; Indigenous Territory and Isiboro Sécure National Park). Ethnographic fieldwork shows that both the state and the lowland indigenous movement have fashioned essentialised understandings of an indigenous identity linked to the environment in order to legitimise competing resource sovereignty claims.
In Latin America, a post-neoliberal trend has emerged that could be said to constitute '21st century socialism' (Kennemore and Weeks, 2011: 267) . Nonetheless, for Bolivians this shift has not resulted in significant movement away from an economic model based on the exploitation of natural resources. Rather than being post-extractivist, social ecologist Eduardo Gudynas argues that the government of Evo Morales advances a type of neoextractivismo progresista (progressive neo-extractivism) that gains popular support by nationalising extractive industries and redistributing State revenues (Gudynas, 2012: 132) . However, this model of national development reifies understandings of progress based on the colonial domination of nature and negates alternative understandings of territoriality, governance and development postulated by many indigenous peoples. A number of scholars have addressed examples of resource struggles in Bolivia and argued that the extraction of non-renewable resources alongside major infrastructural projects comes at the expense of indigenous territorial rights and environmental sustainability (Humphreys Bebbington and Bebbington, 2012; Perreault, 2012; Stefanoni, 2012; Hindery, 2013) . In the first section of the article I discuss the antecedents of the MAS Party in order to contextualise the current TIPNIS conflict. I then outline the background of CIDOB to demonstrate the importance of cultural politics in resource struggles and demands for indigenous territoriality, before outlining the ethnographic methodology used in this study. The final and main section analyses the empirical findings to evaluate the 'legitimacy politics' (Andolina, 2003: 725) surrounding different and competing resource sovereignty demands. I adopt social anthropologist John-Andrew McNeish's definition of resource sovereignties as 'inter-connecting understandings of territoriality, identity, rights, use and nature' (McNeish, 2011: 20) . The TIPNIS conflict illuminates the following three political discourses: (a) government claims for resource nationalism; (b) CIDOB's demands for indigenous territoriality; and (c) articulations of soberanía popular del pueblo (popular sovereignty of the people). I conclude by arguing that the coupling of essentialised articulations of indigeneity with identities of the 'ecologically noble savage' (Redford, 1991: 24) has served to further the public claims-making of both the Bolivian government and CIDOB, marking a new era in Bolivian politics.
The TIPNIS Conflict and the Declining Legitimacy of the MAS
The MAS Party, organised as a 'party of social movements', came to presidential office in 2006 with the express goal of acting as a political instrument for the sovereignty of the people (Dangl, 2010: 9) . The rise of the MAS was made possible through the power of social movements headed 3 by Evo Morales, the well-known peasant-indigenous leader of the coca-growing union (Webber, 2011) . The foundations for this development were laid during the insurrectionary cycle of 2000-2005 when the 'Water and Gas Wars' managed to overthrow two presidents and oust a transnational corporation in an upsurge of popular resistance to neoliberal hegemony (Kohl and Farthing, 2006) . One of the key components of these resource conflicts was the demand for popular sovereignty and the recovery of Bolivian ownership and control of natural resources (Haarstad, 2009 ). The term 'sovereignty' has been central to the MAS who have married broadly felt anti-neoliberal sentiments with an expansive language of indigeneity in order to gain popular support (Albro, 2005) . The project of the MAS has been marked by an ability to cross-cut class and ethnic identities and subsume heterogeneous identities under an 'indigenous nationalism' (Stefanoni, 2006: 37) .
A core agenda of the MAS has been the transformation of the Republic into the Plurinational State of Bolivia, ratified in the new 2009 Constitution. Plurinationalism can be defined as 'a state that merges constitutive sovereignty rooted in the national people (pueblo) and indigenous plurality and self-determination' (Gustafson, 2009: 987) . On the one hand, national sovereignty has been shaped by a number of nationalisations. Most notable is the nationalisation of the hydrocarbons industry announced in Decree 28701 on 1 May 2006. The introduction to the decree states that nationalisation will 'reclaim our natural riches as a fundamental base to recuperate our sovereignty' (cited in Haarstad, 2009: 178) . On the other hand, indigenous plurality has been recognised and territorial rights granted under the new Constitution that names 36 national ethnic languages alongside Spanish. The Constitution offers unprecedented indigenous rights, such as territorial self-determination and autonomy (Art. 2) and recognises indigenous groups' cultures and world-visions, as well as their political, legal and economic structures (Art. 30). Furthermore, Article 30 guarantees prior consultation in regard to the exploitation of non-renewable resources within indigenous territories (Asamblea Constituyente, 2008 ).
However, as Morales comes to the end of his second term of office and prepares to face the 2014 presidential elections, tensions are running high over the perceived failures or contradictions of the MAS project. In particular, debates have arisen over interpretations of development, environmental governance and resource management leading to land and resource sovereignty 4 conflicts, the principle example being the proposal to create a road through the TIPNIS ( Figure   1 ). Although the government argued that the project is necessary to integrate Bolivia's eastern and western regions, the fact that the proposed road would cut through the heart of the national park hints at hidden agendas. Three broad motives have been suggested (cf. McNeish, 2013) .
First, the cocaleros (coca growers) want greater access to the park to expand cultivation. Second, the road is part of the Iniciativa para la Integracion de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana (Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure in South America), for an interoceanic highway to provide Brazil with better access to markets in China (FOBOMADE, 2011) .
Third, the road provides better access for the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons. The 
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CIDOB has been at the forefront of organising opposition to the road project. The umbrella organisation was founded in 1982 and now represents the 34 indigenous nations of the Amazon Basin and Chaco (Yashar, 2005; Postero, 2007a) . CIDOB united diverse ethnic communities in a political project for the legal protection of indigenous lands in the face of increasing colonisation through farming, logging, coca growing and the exploitation of hydrocarbons. These demands revolved around the concept of territorio (territory), which 'became an icon of indigenous-state relations' (Postero, 2007a: 49) . In 1990, CIDOB set out on an indigenous march from the Amazonian city of Trinidad to the highland capital of La Paz, designated the march for el territorio y la dignidad (territory and dignity). This march led to three executive decrees (22609, 22610 and 22611) that gave legal recognition to indigenous territories, including the TIPNIS (Jones, 1990: 5) . Since 1990 a further eight marches have been organised to demand further rights to territory, self-determination and (Brysk, 2000; Canessa, 2006) . Both recognise the right for indigenous peoples to be consulted in decision-making on development proposals. CIDOB has additionally shaped and been shaped by a multicultural turn that led to reforms of the state during the 1990s to accommodate indigenous demands and recognise the multiethnic nature of Latin American societies (Van Cott, 2000; Sieder, 2002) . In 1994, the reorientation of the political landscape due to international rights legislation and ethnic demands prompted a change in the However, Yashar has argued that the neoliberal frameworks of multiculturalism resulted in 'the penetration of the state into the Amazon' having 'challenged indigenous territorial autonomy that had previously survived in the absence of a historically viable state' (Yashar, 2005: 153) . The failure of neoliberal reforms to grant adequate recognition of local autonomous forms and selfdetermination has resulted in increasing demands by CIDOB for participation, through their own organisational bodies, in the political, social, economic and cultural decisions taken in the country thereby 'rethinking the homogenizing and liberal precepts of contemporary citizenship regimes and the state' (Yashar, 2005: 285) . In the TIPNIS conflict, CIDOB has demanded the government's practical application of plurinationalism to incorporate plural understandings of development, democracy and resource management. (2013) argues that this association remains prevalent within intellectual assessments and media attention surrounding the TIPNIS controversy, despite the fact that academic literature, especially within anthropology, has contested the suggestion that there is an intrinsic relationship between indigenous peoples and nature (cf. Diamond, 1986; Colchester, 1994; Krech, 1999) . McNeish asserts that these simplifications are dangerous as they ignore the fact that the indigenous peoples of the lowlands are involved in processes of resource extraction, globalisation and development.
McNeish's cautionary reminder is key to critical assessments of indigenous eco-politics.
Nevertheless, it is important to contextualise indigenous identity claims within the broader climate of contemporary state-indigenous relations. Doing so reveals a new dynamic in indigenous politics, namely that for the first time in Bolivian history the government is also engaged in indigenous eco-politics in order to justify its own brand of resource nationalism.
Thus, lowland indigenous identities are not formed in a political vacuum but counteract government projects of extractive development that jeopardise the livelihoods of indigenous peoples within communally titled territories.
Here, I examine how the strategic use of indigenous essentialism authenticates and makes legitimate different resource sovereignty claims. These articulations are part of a wider 'cultural politics' (Alvarez et al., 1998: 7) . This involves 'call and response interactions, where political communities contest and negotiate ideas that legitimate the political regime and political interests' (Andolina, 2003: 725; original emphasis) . Indeed, comprehending resource conflicts requires an approach that integrates politico-cultural understandings that entangle 'meanings of development, citizenship and the nation itself' (Perreault and Valdivia, 2010: 697) . The performance of an identity narrative is intimately connected to other forms of identity construction, such as those mobilised by the state. In the case study of the TIPNIS conflict these interactions take place through 'languages of contention' (Roseberry, 1996: 83) that circulate around concepts such as vivir bien (living well), Pachamama (Mother Earth), soberanía nacional (national sovereignty), territorio indígena (indigenous territory), casa grande (big house) and soberanía popular del pueblo (popular sovereignty of the people).
Ethnographic Methodology
This paper draws on ethnographic fieldwork with the lowland indigenous movement and urban solidarity campaigns during the TIPNIS conflict in order to understand the politics of representation and the internal dynamics and tensions of re-constructed identity-making.
Ethnography was chosen as the method best able to describe the lived, subjective experiences of marginalisation, the construction of collective grievances and the formation of resistance from below. I also include an analytical treatment of government discourses taken from documentary sources in order to contextualise the narratives articulated by CIDOB. 
Resource Nationalism of the State: Pachamama and Vivir Bien
The Morales administration has legitimised state-led resource nationalism through a popular discourse and imaginary arguing that capitalism is incompatible with environmental sustainability. This effectively amalgamates the notion of an environmentally sustainable model of development with indigenous identities through conceptualisations of the Pachamama and vivir bien, the Spanish name given to the Aymara worldview of suma qamaña (Gudynas, 2011) .
Vivir bien (more popularly known as buen vivir in Ecuador) describes a 'system of knowledge and living based on the communion of humans and nature and on the spatial-temporalharmonious totality of existence' (Walsh, 2010: 18) . Gudynas argues that this perspective collapses the 'classical Western dualism that separates society from Nature' (2011: 444).
However, both Gudynas (2011) and Walsh (2010) point out that the concept has been transformed across the Andean region to inform development narratives.
State-led resource nationalism gains significant legitimacy based on popular sentiment that seeks national sovereignty over extractive industries, i.e. external to transnational corporations (Perreault and Valdivia, 2010) . Postero has described this as 'a national sovereignty free from the strictures that U.S. imperialism and neoliberal capitalism imposed' (Postero, 2010: 24) . David State-led resource nationalism gains widespread support by redistributing revenues through social welfare programmes (cf. Postero, 2013) . This fits with Vice-President García Linera's alternative, and somewhat less radical, understanding of vivir bien as 'managing the tension between the protection of nature and productive development' in order to 'generate public resources that guarantee the population basic minimum conditions ' (cited in FOBOMADE, 2011: 129) .
Rhetoric draws on the Andean world-vision of vivir bien but appropriates and modifies its meaning in line with the pursuit of the neo-extractivist development model. National development, however, does not necessarily match up with the welfare of local communities who bear the burden of environmental and social costs caused by extraction and the construction of major infrastructure (Kohl and Farthing, 2012) . Additionally, the MAS's creation of a national identity is 'decidedly Andean' (Postero, 2007b: 21) , disclaiming the world-visions of the historically more marginalised lowland indigenous peoples (Canessa, 2006) . This echoes Sarah Radcliffe's paper on the application of the development model of buen vivir in Ecuador, which argues that although the concept has the potential for radical transformations of mainstream development, legacies of colonialism remain entrenched within the Ecuadorian state and act to 'reproduce postcolonial hierarchies of poverty, difference and exclusion' (Radcliffe, 2012: 248) . A further criticism is that state-led nationalism does not distribute decision-making powers to the Bolivian people, leaving the demands for popular sovereignty unfulfilled (cf. Cuba, 13 2006; Quijano, 2006; Haarstad, 2009 ).
Nonetheless, Postero argues that vivir bien is 'not just a token rhetorical tool' as it 'has sufficient moral and cultural significance such that its insertion into the debate has changed the discursive and material field in which contestations over resources and distribution are occurring' (Postero, 2013: 90) . It is within this climate of the politics of identity that we must situate lowland indigenous narratives that advance the idea that indigenous communities live in conformity with nature.
Demands for Indigenous Territory: Amazonian Identities of the Casa Grande
Mesa (Table) These two statements suggest that indigenous territory holds both a socio-ecological significance (as a harmonious relationship with the immediate natural environment that the indigenous peoples inhabit) and a political significance (as self-determination and autonomy outside state jurisdiction). This connection identifies the preservation of the environment as integral to the wellbeing of indigenous populations, through their livelihood patterns and forms of social reproduction. In doing so, it acts to authenticate further claims to territorial sovereignty over natural resources.
Both associations rely on political legitimacy derived from the definition of territory as communal land with collective forms of property, governance and resource management. The prohibition of individual property or decisions over resource exploitation is said to act as a social mechanism that preserves local ecosystems and biodiversity. The following statement from a TIPNIS community leader on the Ninth March demonstrates this vision:
When the community needs something, we meet and then we know what we are going to do. If we sacrifice a tree, well, we will do it together. That is our life, a way of working, In many cases, however, these standardised indigenous identities deny the full potential of political demands. Bolivian academics, media and activists often portray the indigenous as maintaining an alternative world-vision to capitalist models of development. For instance, the Bolivian sociologist Raúl Prada has stated that the indigenous marches in defence of the TIPNIS are a clear demonstration against 'the compulsion of extractive development attached to the modernist illusion of wealth and consumption' (Prada, 2012: 160) . Yet many indigenous peoples and communities actively seek development. For instance, the platform of demands of the Ninth March included calls for the construction and implementation of community development models according to the vision and self-determination of the indigenous, the recognition of community organisations as actors in the mineral and hydrocarbon sectors and the right for communities to benefit from the revenues from extractive industries (personal field notes). Nevertheless, internal tensions exist within CIDOB and the TIPNIS over issues of land and resource sovereignties.
Conversations on the Ninth March revealed disagreements about the types of development people desire for the TIPNIS. In particular, the marchers differed over whether hydrocarbons should be exploited or not and whether indigenous peoples in TCOs should be able to capture additional economic revenues from hydrocarbon exploitation in their territories (personal field notes).
Unsurprisingly, these tensions were silenced in public discourses.
At certain times, the government has manipulated essentialised indigenous identities to refute claims to greater autonomy and self-determination. Ley No. 180 described the TIPNIS as an 'intangible' (untouchable) zone, which would prohibit even inhabitants of the park from using its natural resources. As such, members of CIDOB viewed the law as a modest victory that on the one hand would cancel the road project but, on the other, would mean that community development initiatives already operational within the TIPNIS, such as cacao production and caiman hunting, would be suspended. Furthermore, García Linera has countered claims of the TIPNIS being an unspoilt territory, or pulmón del mundo, citing allegations of illegal timber sales by representatives of the park, such as President of the TIPNIS Sub-central, Fernando Vargas, and ex-President of CIDOB, Marcial Fabricano. García Linera thus argues that the TIPNIS is a 'un pulmón horadado por la extracción ilegal de madera y cuero, un pulmón con cáncer por la nicotina' (a lung pierced by the illegal extraction of wood and leather, a lung with cancer from nicotine) (García Linera, 2012:35) . The idealisation of lowland indigenous peoples as living in harmonious balance with nature can therefore limit the pursuit of wider political objectives.
Alternative Demands for Popular Sovereignty of the People
Finally, there is the demand for soberanía popular del pueblo pursued by movements on the political 'Left'. This vision postulates a reworking of the nation-state from liberal forms of representative democracy to collective forms of decision-making in a self-governing society (Máiz, 2008) . The principle of popular sovereignty requires that state authority be determined by the political consent of the people. Urban movements and activists in defence of the TIPNIS have promoted this form of resource sovereignty, which has become a bone of contention in solidarity networks with CIDOB.
Tensions were evident in a meeting in Puerto San Borja to decide the platform of demands for the Ninth March. A heated discussion arose over discussion point four, Tierra, Territorio y Madre Tierra (Land, Territory and Mother Earth). Conversation quickly turned to natural resource governance, with little reference to the protection of the environment or biodiversity. Indigenous representatives from CIDOB and the TIPNIS specified their desire for greater economic rights over their lands and resources, arguing that the government must be the one to guarantee these jurisdictional rights for the indigenous peoples. The agenda focused around the right to selfdetermination, namely the right to decide their own forms of development through their respective decision-making structures and the right to prior consultation over projects initiated by the state or international corporations. However, representatives from the highland indigenous organisation CONAMAQ were much more vocal about the need to sustain the harmonious balance between humans and nature, arguing that neither state-led nor foreign-led capital would be acceptable as long as neo-extractivism continued. These debates between the indigenous marchers provoked a response from one of the urban activists, a so-called 'MAS dissident ', who argued that the indigenous cannot be the only ones to decide the future of natural resources, because national development is in the interest of all Bolivians. Rather, reiterating calls for popular sovereignty, he argued that the whole country has the right to communal development.
Furthermore, he asserted the right of urban solidarity movements to be involved in the debates since the TIPNIS is a national protected area and therefore of concern to all Bolivians (personal field notes). It is important to note, though, that indigenous groups have rarely made explicit demands for territorial enclosure, instead demanding political representation and participation in the state through their respective organisational structures.
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Conclusions
Several competing resource sovereignty claims were made during the TIPNIS conflict. Relying on legitimacy politics, notions of indigeneity have been coupled with identities based on environmental harmony in the formation of both state-led resource nationalism and demands for indigenous territoriality by the Amazonian indigenous peoples. The active praxis of eco-politics renegotiates the power relations embedded within indigenous-state interactions, as well as authenticating resource sovereignty claims amongst the wider Bolivian populace.
The importance of the issues discussed in this article is underlined by the rise in indigenous nationalisms being played out within the Latin American region alongside the pursuit of neoextractive development models. State-led resource nationalism has in some cases aggravated land and resource struggles. In Bolivia, the monopolisation of indigenous identity-making by the government has become a sticking point in the plurinational agenda. A fuller process of decolonising the nation-state would need to encompass plural understandings of development, nature, democracy and territoriality through the self-determination of indigenous populations.
Until this occurs, the state will continue to play out colonial relations of domination that politically, economically and culturally marginalise certain sectors of the indigenous population.
Questions therefore remain over whether and how individual and communal interests can be reconciled and how indigenous peoples can be incorporated as active citizens within Bolivia.
However, as Gustafson (2009) aptly points out, plurinationalism is a process, rather than an established model. This process will be shaped by resource conflicts in the years to come. For now, though, in the lead-up to the 2014 presidential elections where Morales will run for a third term, the government has taken the decision to suspend the road project through the TIPNIS.
